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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-372
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GEORGIA, PETITIONER v. THOMAS McCOLLUM,
WILLIAM JOSEPH McCOLLUM and
 ELLA HAMPTON McCOLLUM
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
georgia
[June 18, 1992]

  Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.
  For more than a century, this Court consistently and
repeatedly has reaffirmed that racial discrimination by the
State in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause.
See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880).
Last Term this Court held that racial discrimination in a
civil litigant's exercise of peremptory challenges also
violates the Equal Protection Clause.  See Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. ___ (1991).  Today, we are
asked to decide whether the Constitution prohibits a
criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful racial
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges.
                            I
  On August 10, 1990, a grand jury sitting in Dougherty
County, Ga., returned a six-count indictment charging
respondents with aggravated assault and simple battery.
See App. 2.  The indictment alleged that respondents beat
and assaulted Jerry and Myra Collins.  Respondents are
white; the alleged victims are African-Americans.  Shortly
after the events, a leaflet was widely distributed in the local
African-American community reporting the assault and
urging community residents not to patronize respondents'
business.
  Before jury selection began, the prosecution moved to
prohibit respondents from exercising peremptory challenges
in a racially discriminatory manner.  The State explained
that it expected to show that the victims' race was a factor
in the alleged assault.  According to the State, counsel for
respondents had indicated a clear intention to use peremp-
tory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, arguing
that the circumstances of their case gave them the right to
exclude African-American citizens from participating as
jurors in the trial.  Observing that 43 percent of the
county's population is African-American, the State contend-
ed that, if a statistically representative panel is assembled
for jury selection, 18 of the potential 42 jurors would be
African-American.  With 20 peremptory challenges,
respondents therefore would be able to remove all the
African-American potential jurors.  Relying on Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), the Sixth Amendment, and
the Georgia Constitution, the State sought an order
providing that, if it succeeded in making out a prima facie
case of racial discrimination by respondents, the latter
would be required to articulate a racially neutral explana-
tion for peremptory challenges.
The trial judge denied the State's motion, holding that
-[n]either Georgia nor federal law prohibits criminal
defendants from exercising peremptory strikes in a racially
discriminatory manner.-  App. 14.  The issue was certified
for immediate appeal.  Id., at 15 and 18.
The Supreme Court of Georgia, by a 4-3 vote, affirmed
the trial court's ruling.  State v. McCollum, 261 Ga. 473,
405 S.E.2d 688 (1991).  The court acknowledged that in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S.___ (1991),
this Court had found that the exercise of a peremptory
challenge in a racially discriminatory manner -would
constitute an impermissible injury- to the excluded juror.
261 Ga., at 473; 405 S.E.2d, at 689.  The court noted,
however, that Edmonson involved private civil litigants, not
criminal defendants.  -Bearing in mind the long history of
jury trials as an essential element of the protection of
human rights,- the court -decline[d] to diminish the free
exercise of peremptory strikes by a criminal defendant.-
Ibid.  Three justices dissented, arguing that Edmonson and
other decisions of this Court establish that racially based
peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant violate the
Constitution.  261 Ga., at 473; 405 S.E.2d, at 689 (Hunt, J.);
id., at 475; 405 S.E.2d, at 690 (Benham, J.); id., at 479; 405
S.E.2d, at 693 (Fletcher, J.).  A motion for reconsideration
was denied.  App. 60.
We granted certiorari to resolve a question left open by
our prior cases--whether the Constitution prohibits a
criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful racial
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges.
___ U. S. ___ (1991).
                II
Over the last century, in an almost unbroken chain of
decisions, this Court gradually has abolished race as a
consideration for jury service.  In Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U. S. 303 (1880), the Court invalidated a state statute
providing that only white men could serve as jurors.  While
stating that a defendant has no right to a -petit jury
composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race,-
id., at 305, the Court held that a defendant does have the
right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected by
nondiscriminatory criteria.  See also Neal v. Delaware, 103
U.S. 370, 397 (1881); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 599
(1935) (State cannot exclude African-Americans from jury
venire on false assumption that they, as a group, are not
qualified to serve as jurors).
In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), the Court
was confronted with the question whether an African-
American defendant was denied equal protection by the
State's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude
members of his race from the petit jury.  Id., at 209-210.
Although the Court rejected the defendant's attempt to
establish an equal protection claim premised solely on the
pattern of jury strikes in his own case, it acknowledged that
proof of systematic exclusion of African-Americans through
the use of peremptories over a period of time might estab-
lish such a violation.  Id., at 224-228.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), the Court
discarded Swain's evidentiary formulation.  The Batson
Court held that a defendant may establish a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit
jury based solely on the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges at the defendant's trial.  Id., at 87.  -Once the
defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts
to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for
challenging black jurors.-  Id., at 97.
Last Term this Court applied the Batson framework in
two other contexts.  In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. ___ (1991),
it held that in the trial of a white criminal defendant, a
prosecutor is prohibited from excluding African-American
jurors on the basis of race.  In Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U. S. ___ (1991), the Court decided that
in a civil case, private litigants cannot exercise their
peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner.
In deciding whether the Constitution prohibits criminal
defendants from exercising racially discriminatory peremp-
tory challenges, we must answer four questions.  First,
whether a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner inflicts the
harms addressed by Batson.  Second, whether the exercise
of peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant consti-
tutes state action.  Third, whether prosecutors have
standing to raise this constitutional challenge.  And fourth,
whether the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant
nonetheless preclude the extension of our precedents to this
case.
                III
                 A
The majority in Powers recognized that -Batson `was
designed -to serve multiple ends,-' only one of which was to
protect individual defendants from discrimination in the
selection of jurors.-  499 U. S., at ___ (slip op. 5).  As in
Powers and Edmonson, the extension of Batson in this
context is designed to remedy the harm done to the -dignity
of persons- and to the -integrity of the courts.-  Powers, at
___ (slip op. 1).
As long ago as Strauder, this Court recognized that
denying a person participation in jury service on account of
his race unconstitutionally discriminates against the
excluded juror.  100 U.S., at 308.  See also Batson, 476
U. S., at 87.  While -[a]n individual juror does not have a
right to sit on any particular petit jury, . . . he or she does
possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of
race.-  Powers, 499 U. S., at ___ (slip op. 9).  Regardless of
who invokes the discriminatory challenge, there can be no
doubt that the harm is the same--in all cases, the juror is
subjected to open and public racial discrimination.
But -the harm from discriminatory jury selection extends
beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded
juror to touch the entire community.-  Batson, 476 U. S., at
87.  One of the goals of our jury system is -to impress upon
the criminal defendant and the community as a whole that
a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance
with the law by persons who are fair.-  Powers, 499 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op. 12).  Selection procedures that purposefully
exclude African-Americans from juries undermine that
public confidence-as well they should.  -The overt wrong,
often apparent to the entire jury panel, casts doubt over the
obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to
adhere to the law throughout the trial of the cause.-  Id., at
___ (slip op. 11-12).  See generally Underwood, Ending
Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It,
Anyway?, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 725, 748-750 (1992).
The need for public confidence is especially high in cases
involving race-related crimes.  In such cases, emotions in
the affected community will inevitably be heated and
volatile.  Public confidence in the integrity of the criminal
justice system is essential for preserving community peace
in trials involving race-related crimes.  See Alschuler, The
Supreme Court and the Jury:  Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U.Chi. L.
Rev. 153, 195-196 (1989) (describing two trials in Miami,
Fla., in which all African-American jurors were peremptori-
ly struck by white defendants accused of racial beating, and
the public outrage and riots that followed the defendants'
acquittal).
Be it at the hands of the State or the defense, if a court
allows jurors to be excluded because of group bias, it is a
willing participant in a scheme that could only undermine
the very foundation of our system of justice-our citizens'
confidence in it.  Just as public confidence in criminal
justice is undermined by a conviction in a trial where racial
discrimination has occurred in jury selection, so is public
confidence undermined where a defendant, assisted by
racially discriminatory peremptory strikes, obtains an
acquittal.
                 B
The fact that a defendant's use of discriminatory peremp-
tory challenges harms the jurors and the community does
not end our equal protection inquiry.  Racial discrimination,
although repugnant in all contexts, violates the Constitu-
tion only when it is attributable to state action.  See Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).  Thus, the
second question that must be answered is whether a
criminal defendant's exercise of a peremptory challenge
constitutes state action for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause.
Until Edmonson, the cases decided by this Court that
presented the problem of racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges involved assertions of discrimination by a
prosecutor, a quintessential state actor.  In Edmonson, by
contrast, the contested peremptory challenges were exer-
cised by a private defendant in a civil action.  In order to
determine whether state action was present in that setting,
the Court in Edmonson used the analytical framework
summarized in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922
(1982).
The first inquiry is -whether the claimed [constitutional]
deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or
privilege having its source in state authority.-  Id., at 939.
-There can be no question- that peremptory challenges
satisfy this first requirement, as they -are permitted only
when the government, by statute or decisional law, deems
it appropriate to allow parties to exclude a given number of
persons who otherwise would satisfy the requirements for
service on the petit jury.-  Edmonson, 500 U. S., at ___ (slip
op. 5).  As in Edmonson, a Georgia defendant's right to
exercise peremptory challenges and the scope of that right
are established by a provision of state law.  Ga. Code Ann.
15-12-165 (1990).
The second inquiry is whether the private party charged
with the deprivation can be described as a state actor.  See
Lugar, 457 U. S., at 941-942.  In resolving that issue, the
Court in Edmonson found it useful to apply three princi-
ples:  1) -the extent to which the actor relies on governmen-
tal assistance and benefits-; 2) -whether the actor is
performing a traditional governmental function-; and 3)
-whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way
by the incidents of governmental authority.-  500 U. S., at
___ (slip op. 6-7).
As to the first principle, the Edmonson Court found that
the peremptory challenge system, as well as the jury system
as a whole, -simply could not exist- without the -overt and
significant participation of the government.-  Id., at ___
(slip op. 7).  Georgia provides for the compilation of jury
lists by the board of jury commissioners in each county and
establishes the general criteria for service and the sources
for creating a pool of qualified jurors representing a fair
cross section of the community. Ga. Code Ann. 15-12-40.
State law further provides that jurors are to be selected by
a specified process, 15-12-42; they are to be summoned to
court under the authority of the State, 15-12-120; and
they are to be paid an expense allowance by the State
whether or not they serve on a jury, 15-12-9.  At court,
potential jurors are placed in panels in order to facilitate
examination by counsel, 15-12-131; they are administered
an oath, 15-12-132; they are questioned on voir dire to
determine whether they are impartial, 15-12-164; and
they are subject to challenge for cause, 15-12-163.
In light of these procedures, the defendant in a Georgia
criminal case relies on -governmental assistance and
benefits- that are equivalent to those found in the civil
context in Edmonson.  -By enforcing a discriminatory
peremptory challenge, the Court `has ... elected to place its
power, property and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimi-
nation.'-  Edmonson, 500 U. S., at ___ (slip op. 9) (citation
omitted).
In regard to the second principle, the Court in Edmonson
found that peremptory challenges perform a traditional
function of the government:  -Their sole purpose is to
permit litigants to assist the government in the selection of
an impartial trier of fact] the selection of an impartial trier
of fact.-  Id., at ___ (slip op. 5).  And, as the Edmonson
Court recognized, the jury system in turn -performs the
critical governmental functions of guarding the rights of
litigants and `insur[ing] continued acceptance of the laws by
all of the people'-  Id., at ___ (slip op. 9) (citation omitted).]
These same conclusions apply with even greater force in the
criminal context because the selection of a jury in a
criminal case fulfills a unique and constitutionally com-
pelled governmental function.  Compare Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968) (making Sixth Amendment
applicable to States through Fourteenth Amendment) with
Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211
(1916) (States do not have a constitutional obligation to
provide a jury trial in civil cases).  Cf. West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 53, n. 10, 57 (1988) (private physician hired by
State to provide medical care to prisoners was state actor
because doctor was hired to fulfill State's constitutional
obligation to attend to necessary medical care of prison
inmates).  The State cannot avoid its constitutional respon-
sibilities by delegating a public function to private parties.
Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (private political
party's determination of qualifications for primary voters
held to constitute state action).
Finally, the Edmonson Court indicated that the court-
room setting in which the peremptory challenge is exercised
intensifies the harmful effects of the private litigant's
discriminatory act and contributes to its characterization as
state action.  These concerns are equally present in the
context of a criminal trial.  Regardless of who precipitated
the jurors' removal, the perception and the reality in a
criminal trial will be that the court has excused jurors
based on race, an outcome that will be attributed to the
State.
Respondents nonetheless contend that the adversarial
relationship between the defendant and the prosecution
negates the governmental character of the peremptory
challenge.  Respondents rely on Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312 (1981), in which a defendant sued, under 42 U.S.C.
1983, the public defender who represented him.  The
defendant claimed that the public defender had violated his
constitutional rights in failing to provide adequate repre-
sentation.  This Court determined that a public defender
does not qualify as a state actor when engaged in his
general representation of a criminal defendant.
Polk County did not hold that the adversarial relationship
of a public defender with the State precludes a finding of
state action-it held that this adversarial relationship
prevented the attorney's public employment from alone
being sufficient to support a finding of state action.
Instead, the determination whether a public defender is a
state actor for a particular purpose depends on the nature
and context of the function he is performing.  For example,
in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), this Court held
that a public defender, in making personnel decisions on
behalf of the State, is a state actor who must comply with
constitutional requirements.  And the Dodson Court itself
noted, without deciding, that a public defender may act
under color of state law while performing certain adminis-
trative, and possibly investigative, functions.  See 454 U.S.,
at 325.
The exercise of a peremptory challenge differs significant-
ly from other actions taken in support of a defendant's
defense.  In exercising a peremptory challenge, a criminal
defendant is wielding the power to choose a quintessential
governmental body--indeed, the institution of government
on which our judicial system depends.  Thus, as we held in
Edmonson, when -a government confers on a private body
the power to choose the government's employees or officials,
the private body will be bound by the constitutional
mandate of race neutrality.-  500 U.S., at ___ (slip op. 10).
Lastly, the fact that a defendant exercises a peremptory
challenge to further his interest in acquittal does not
conflict with a finding of state action.  Whenever a private
actor's conduct is deemed -fairly attributable- to the
government, it is likely that private motives will have
animated the actor's decision.  Indeed, in Edmonson, the
Court recognized that the private party's exercise of
peremptory challenges constituted state action, even though
the motive underlying the exercise of the peremptory
challenge may be to protect a private interest.  See 500
U. S., at ___ (slip op. 11).
                 C
Having held that a defendant's discriminatory exercise of
a peremptory challenge is a violation of equal protection, we
move to the question whether the State has standing to
challenge a defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges.  In Powers, 499 U. S., at ___, this Court held
that a white criminal defendant has standing to raise the
equal protection rights of black jurors wrongfully excluded
from jury service.  While third-party standing is a limited
exception, the Powers Court recognized that a litigant may
raise a claim on behalf of a third party if the litigant can
demonstrate that he has suffered a concrete injury, that he
has a close relation to the third party, and that there exists
some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect its
own interests.  Id., at ___ (slip op. 10).  In Edmonson, the
Court applied the same analysis in deciding that civil
litigants had standing to raise the equal protection rights
of jurors excluded on the basis of their race.
In applying the first prong of its standing analysis, the
Powers Court found that a criminal defendant suffered
cognizable injury -because racial discrimination in the
selection of jurors `casts doubt on the integrity of the
judicial process,' and places the fairness of a criminal
proceeding in doubt.-  Id., at ___ (slip op. 11) (citation
omitted).  In Edmonson, this Court found that these harms
were not limited to the criminal sphere.  500 U. S., at ___
(slip op. 15).  Surely, a State suffers a similar injury when
the fairness and integrity of its own judicial process is
undermined.
In applying the second prong of its standing analysis, the
Powers Court held that voir dire permits a defendant to
-establish a relation, if not a bond of trust, with the jurors,-
a relation that -continues throughout the entire trial.-  499
U. S., at ___ (slip op. 13).  -Exclusion of a juror on the basis
of race severs that relation in an invidious way.-  Edmon-
son, 500 U. S., at ___ (slip op. 14).
The State's relation to potential jurors in this case is
closer than the relationships approved in Powers and
Edmonson.  As the representative of all its citizens, the
State is the logical and proper party to assert the invasion
of the constitutional rights of the excluded jurors in a
criminal trial.  Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
the State from denying persons within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
In applying the final prong of its standing analysis, the
Powers Court recognized that, although individuals exclud-
ed from jury service on the basis of race have a right to
bring suit on their own behalf, the -barriers to a suit by an
excluded juror are daunting.-  499 U. S., at ___ (slip op. 14).
See also Edmonson, 500 U. S., at ___ (slip op. 14).  The
barriers are no less formidable in this context.  See
Dunnigan, 88 Colum. L. Rev., at 367; Underwood, 92
Colum. L. Rev., at 757 (summarizing barriers to suit by
excluded juror).  Accordingly, we hold that the State has
standing to assert the excluded jurors' rights.
                 D
The final question is whether the interests served by
Batson must give way to the rights of a criminal defendant.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recall that
peremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected
fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state-created
means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a
fair trial.  This Court repeatedly has stated that the right
to a peremptory challenge may be withheld altogether
without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an
impartial jury and a fair trial.  See Frazier v. United States,
335 U. S. 497, 505, n. 11 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299
U. S. 123, 145 (1936); Stilson v. United States, 250 U. S.
583, 586 (1919); see also Swain, 380 U. S., at 219.
Yet in Swain, the Court reviewed the -very old creden-
tials,- id., at 212, of the peremptory challenge and noted the
-long and widely held belief that the peremptory challenge
is a necessary part of trial by jury.-  Id., at 219; see id., at
212-219.  This Court likewise has recognized that -the role
of litigants in determining the jury's composition provides
one reason for wide acceptance of the jury system and of its
verdicts.-  Edmonson, 500 U. S., at ___ (slip op. 15).
We do not believe that this decision will undermine the
contribution of the peremptory challenge to the admin-
istration of justice.  Nonetheless, -if race stereotypes are the
price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair,- we reaffirm
today that such a -price is too high to meet the standard of
the Constitution.-  Edmonson, 500 U. S., at ___ (slip op.
15-16).  Defense counsel is limited to -legitimate, lawful
conduct.-  Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, 166 (1986)
(defense counsel does not render ineffective assistance when
he informs his client that he would disclose the client's
perjury to the court and move to withdraw from representa-
tion).  It is an affront to justice to argue that a fair trial
includes the right to discriminate against a group of citizens
based upon their race.
Nor does a prohibition of the exercise of discriminatory
peremptory challenges violate a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Counsel
can ordinarily explain the reasons for peremptory challeng-
es without revealing anything about trial strategy or any
confidential client communications.  In the rare case in
which the explanation for a challenges would entail
confidential communications or reveal trial strategy, an in
camera discussion can be arranged.  See United States v.
Zolin, 491 U. S. 554 (1989); cf. Batson, 476 U. S., at 97
(expressing confidence that trial judges can develop proce-
dures to implement the Court's holding).  In any event,
neither the Sixth Amendment right nor the attorney-client
privilege gives a criminal defendant the right to carry out
through counsel an unlawful course of conduct.  See Nix,
475 U. S., at 166; Zolin, 491 U. S., at 562-563.  See Swift,
Defendants, Racism and the Peremptory Challenge, 22
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 177, 207-208 (1991).
Lastly, a prohibition of the discriminatory exercise of
peremptory challenges does not violate a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury.  The goal
of the Sixth Amendment is -jury impartiality with respect
to both contestants.-  Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 483
(1990).  See also Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68 (1887).
We recognize, of course, that a defendant has the right to
an impartial jury that can view him without racial animus,
which so long has distorted our system of criminal justice.
We have, accordingly, held that there should be a mecha-
nism for removing those on the venire whom the defendant
has specific reason to believe would be incapable of con-
fronting and suppressing their racism.  See Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U. S. 524, 526-527 (1973); Rosales-Lopez v.
United States, 451 U. S. 182, 189-190 (1981) (plurality
opinion of White, J.).  Cf. Morgan v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___
(1992) (exclusion of juror in capital trial is permissible upon
showing that juror is incapable of considering sentences
other than death).
But there is a distinction between exercising a perempto-
ry challenge to discriminate invidiously against jurors on
account of race and exercising a peremptory challenge to
remove an individual juror who harbors racial prejudice.
This Court firmly has rejected the view that assumptions of
partiality based on race provide a legitimate basis for
disqualifying a person as an impartial juror.  As this Court
stated just last Term in Powers, -[w]e may not accept as a
defense to racial discrimination the very stereotype the law
condemns.-  499 U. S., at ___ (slip op. 9).  -In our heteroge-
neous society policy as well as constitutional considerations
militate against the divisive assumption-as a per se
rule-that justice in a court of law may turn upon the
pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice of
religion.-  Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589, 596, n. 8 (1976).
We therefore reaffirm today that the exercise of a perempto-
ry challenge must not be based on either the race of the
juror or the racial stereotypes held by the party.
                IV
We hold that the Constitution prohibits a criminal
defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on
the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges.
Accordingly, if the State demonstrates a prima facie case of
racial discrimination by the defendants, the defendants,
must articulate a racially neutral explanation for perempto-
ry challenges.  The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Georgia is reversed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

                       It is so ordered.